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CASE NOTES
Therefore, the Stewart case follows the modern trend in recognizing
that probation and physical custody are not to be equated. It also recog-
nizes that a court may have jurisdiction over a probationer without the
consent of the court which placed him on probation. On the other hand,
in its disregard for the rule of comity, it seems to have limited support.
DOMESTICS-PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY NOT
OVERCOME BY NON-ACCESS UNTIL 232 DAYS
PRIOR TO BIRTH IN WEDLOCK
Richard Holder, plaintiff, commenced this suit for annulment of his
marriage to the defendant Ruth Holder on the grounds that his wife had
fraudulently induced him to enter into it by representing that she was
pregnant with his child. The parties had intercourse on December 24,
1956, were married on February 2, 1957 and the child was born on
August 13, 1957. The plaintiff contended this was not his child since the
normal period of gestation is 270 days, and that he had no access to his
wife until December 24, 1956, which was only 232 days prior to the birth
of the child. Before that time he was in Alaska. The Supreme Court of
Utah in reversing a decree for the plaintiff held that evidence which
showed only 232 days had elapsed between the first possible date of
coition and the date of birth was insufficient to overcome the presumption
of the legitimacy of a child. Holder v. Holder, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah, 1959).
The legal presumption is always that a child born in lawful wedlock is
legitimate.' This presumption is founded on morality, decency, and public
policy and is one of the strongest presumptions in the law.2 Although
there have been many and varied criteria or formulae used to determine
the sufficiency of rebutting evidence,3 the majority of American courts
have, in cases involving the presumption of legitimacy, demanded more than
a mere preponderance of the evidence; most of them requiring clear, con-
vincing, and satisfactory proof and some even requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.4 This proof must be sufficient to show that the husband
was: (1) impotent; (2) entirely absent, so as to have no intercourse or
communication of any kind with the mother; (3) entirely absent for the
period during which the child must, in the course of nature, have been be-
gotten by the alleged father; or (4) only present under such circumstances
' Phillips v. Allen, 84 Allen (Mass.) 453 (1861).
2 Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298,70 Pac. 91 (1902).
3 9 Wigmore on Evidence, S 2527 (3rd ed., 1940).
4 Admire v. Admire, 42 N.Y.S.2d 755, 180 Misc. 68 (1943); In re Jones' Estate, 110
Vt. 438, 8 A.2d 631 (1939).
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as afford clear and satisfactory proof or proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that there was no sexual intercourse.5
The average period of conception is 270 days.6 When non-access is
pleaded as a defense, the question then arises of whether proving there was
no access with the mother until a time shorter than the average period of
conception will be sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the
legitimacy of a child born in wedlock. If so, how much time shorter than
the average period of conception must be proven to establish that the
child, in the course of nature, could not have been begotten by the
alleged father?
A review of recent cases indicates that the presumption of legitimacy
may be rebutted; however, no United States jurisdiction has yet decided
at what point in time, as a matter of law, without any further proof, that a
certain number of days is too short for the husband without access during
the period to have been the father.
A fully developed child born 225 days after marriage was held, in a
California case, to be legitimate in view of the policy., to declare a child
legitimate when it can fairly so be done. The court went on to say that
this period of gestation was not so short as to be abnormal, or contrary
to the usual operation of the laws of nature. 7
In a recent Massachusetts case, the court held that a period of non-
access until 216 days before the birth of the child was insufficient to over-
come the presumption of legitimacy. This seems to be the shortest period
of gestation held insufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.8
On the other hand in Pilgrim v. Pilgrim,9 an Indiana case, the court
held that where there is evidence that the husband could not have had
access to his wife until 190 days before birth of the child that this is
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the legitimacy of a child born
during wedlock.
Consequently, the case law indicates that the period of gestation is
sufficient to establish the defense of non-access if it is somewhere between
the 216 days which was held insufficient in Silke v. Silke'° and the 190
days found to be sufficient as a matter of law in Michigan.
In conclusion, in cases where non-access is pleaded as a defense, it may
be sufficient to rebut the presumption of the legitimacy of a child born
in lawful wedlock. This can be done by showing the alleged father had
5) In re Schuman's Estate, 83 Wis. 250, 53 N.W. 455 (1892).
G Holder v. Holder, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah, 1959).
7 Dazey v. Dazey, 50 Cal.App.2d 15, 122 P.2d 308 (1942).
8 Silke v. Silke, 325 Mass. 487,91 N.E.2d 200 (1950).
9 118 Ind. App. 6, 75 N.E.2d 159 (1947).
10 325 Mass. 487,91 N.E.2d 200 (1950).
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no access until a peribd"prior to the birth of the child which is too
short for the person to have been the father according to the laws of
nature. The Holder case follows the modern trend which fixes this period
somewhere between 190 and 216 days prior to the birth of the child. This
seems to be stretching the laws of nature beyond a natural point since
the average period of conception is 270 days; however, the motivating
forces of public policy and the long historic strength of the presumption
favoring the legitimacy of children seem sufficient justification.
EVIDENCE-JUROR OBTAINING INFORMATION ON "ARC-
ING" BY READING BOOK ON ELECTRICITY DURING
TRIAL HELD REVERSIBLE ERROR
The decedent suffered death by electrocution while installing an out-
door television antenna. The plaintiff (the decedent's wife) brought the
action against the defendant corporation, alleging its highwire, which
passed through the decedent's yard, was the cause of death. Although the
plaintiff introduced evidence which tended to prove that the defendant
had not maintained the highwire the required distance above the ground
as specified by the Kansas statute, she did not introduce evidence showing
exactly how this highwire resulted in her husband's death. While the
jury was recessed, Noll, one of its members, read a book on electricity
and, when the jury reconvened, reported his findings concerning the
arcing and jumping characteristics of electricity.' The majority of the
jury admitted hearing Noll's statements, but only a few admitted to giving
them any consideration. Upon discovering Noll's statements, the defend-
ant filed a motion for a new trial which was denied. The Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed and remanded the cause because of jury misconduct.
Thomas v. Kansas Po'wer & Light Co., 340 P.2d 379 (Kan., 1959).
The court, in reversing, accepted the plaintiff's admission that the
juror was guilty of misconduct as conclusive, but stated that it would
have found the same result even if no such admission had been made.
As a result of this finding, the court gave a very cursory explanation as
to why the juror's statement would constitute jury misconduct. Although
not specifically stated, the issue of the case was whether arcing is a
matter of common knowledge.
At early common law, it was permissible for a member of the jury
to have personal knowledge of the case and, in fact, a juror was chosen
because he was possessed of this personal knowledge.2 This rule had
such a wide scope that the jury could return a verdict notwithstanding
I Although arcing has a strict technical ,na gift is referred to in some cases as the
jumping characteristic of electr'ie<-ffIe latter meaning will be used in this note.
2 Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 3, pp. 37 3, 4 (1768).
